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Uneasy Partners: A Theological dialogue with Daniel Dennett’s Philosophy of Mind 






The thesis sets out the goal of isolating Daniel Dennett’s multiple draft model of 
consciousness from the rest of his theory of mind. This is done because while his 
eliminative materialism is obviously not compatible with Christian Orthodoxy the 
polyvalent mind that it supposes is ripe for theological interpretation. Dennett’s theory 
of the mind encountered serious criticism from Maxwell Bennet and Peter Hacker in 
their book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience and the debate between Dennett 
and these authors is examined with the author ultimately siding with Dennett. Turning 
to Christian accounts of the self it is proposed that the use of the multiple draft model 
as hermeneutic device is extremely helpful in reading scripture, especially in the 
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If the study of Theology is an attempt to relate concepts of revelation, belief and 
Christian practice to all aspects of human existence then it is important that no domain 
of thought or inquiry remain outside the scope of theological reflection. As a theologian 
I have found it particularly important to examine the relation between the 
presuppositions of modern culture as particularly expressed through scientific thought. 
In the words of an erstwhile intellectual companion “The Christian is to resist the spirit 
of the world. But when we say this we must understand that the world-spirit does not 
always take the same form
1
” In this respect much of what is being said which shapes 
culture in the West is now put forward by scientists.  It would be foolhardy to assume 
that scientists themselves as specialists in a particular methodology would be ignorant 
to philosophical theories or the cultural consequences of their own work. Rather they 
are at the forefront of   public intellectual discussion with figures such as Steven Pinker, 
and Jared Diamond holding a place of privilege alongside philosophers and political 
theorists in the shaping of societal goals and mores. 
 Science also offers an excellent partner for theological dialogue, particularly the 
field of cognitive neuroscience. This is because research into the functioning of the brain 
on an organic level runs parallel to research on the brain on a psychological level. 
Neurobiological discoveries have allowed for manipulations of the brain through 
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mechanical (surgery) and now chemical means with the potential to genetically alter an 
individual being explored. Psychological developments especially from the behaviourist 
school have opened new avenues to explore the power of suggestion, influence and 
coercion.  These are in turn mirrored by the academic reflection on the nature of the 
mind which leapt to the forefront of philosophy in the 20
th
 century. Such reflections 
have influenced the connections societies make between conscious states and ethical 
decisions. As an example, we now believe that one of the main issues at stake in 
determining when to prolong a life by technological means is the ascription of some 
form of conscious state to the person in question. Terms such a permanent vegetative 
state and the distinction between brain death and physical death enter the conversation 
in ways unimaginable one hundred years ago. Moving forward, new questions will arise 
about the ethics of altering a person’s genome (either in utero or as an adult) and new 
more “humane” ways of altering the mind of an individual which supposedly are better 
than primitive techniques such as lobotomies. Even in this brief sketch it is obvious that 
the topic of mind is filled with issues of ethics, personhood, interpretations of 
evolutionary biology (and psychology) and power dynamics. If theology ignores these 
dialogue partners it runs the risk of being out-narrated in scientific and ethical spheres 
just as it has been in the political.  
This is not to say that philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists are all 
striving towards a unified understanding of the mind in a harmonious fashion. This 
thesis will navigate a path through the thought of one particular philosopher of mind, 
Daniel Dennett, and on to the challenge of reading Scripture in the light some of his 
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claims regarding our understanding of consciousness. At issue is a challenge issued to 
the status quo of both neuroscience and most thinkers within philosophy of mind and 
the response which followed. That challenge was proposed by Maxwell Bennett and 
Peter Hacker in their 2003 book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (hereafter 
PFN) which attacked some of the underlying claims in Daniel Dennett’s own work. 
Bennett is a neuroscientist and Hacker a philosopher who works within a 
Wittgensteinian tradition. The debate between Dennett on one side and Bennett & 
Hacker on the other is engaged in order to use it as a heuristic device to examine 
tensions that underlie the whole concept of mind as a separate category which is the 
crux of the debate in between the two sides. The debate must be addressed in order to 
justify my choice of dialogue partner; it is not that the use of Dennett for theological 
reflection is predicated upon his triumph in the debate but that it is precisely at the 
point of encounter between these two sides that we encounter a fruitful tension. 
  It is the tensions in the debate which are instructive for the theologian since 
they reveal at a technical level some of the anxieties surrounding the supposed 
demystification of consciousness. For religious adherents this goes beyond the surface 
level of ethical decisions relating to consciousness all the way to the ontological 
grounding of the self and the concept of soul. As I will show this comes from a history of 
conceptual confusion regarding the terms that surround our language of the conscious 
experience being intertwined with concepts of body/mind/spirit, spirit/flesh, body/soul 
modalities. For Christians specifically and the Judaeo-Christian influenced West more 
generally this is owing to the sometimes confusing use of these terms in the letters of St. 
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Paul. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the dangers faced in accepting the 
mind/brain distinction insofar as it permits a deconstruction similar to that has been 
prefigured by the denial of Cartesian dualism. Reading Paul through Dennettian eyes will 
allow us to see more clearly Paul’s vision of a unified self that in every aspect seeks God. 
The goal is not to present Dennett’s claims as beyond criticism, but rather to see even in 
his Multiple Draft Model a way to retain the cogency of a Christian account of the self. 
 To be clear on my own methodology I will approach the topic from a 
stance grounded in a conception of science that owes much to Radical Orthodoxy’s 
critique of secular modernity and its’ universalizing of scientific materialism in all 
aspects of life
2
. There will be certain choices, especially among the biblical exegetes I 
engage that reflect my own Evangelical tradition and clarify the chorus with which I wish 
to be identified. Nevertheless it is the Radical Orthodox combination of a ressourcement 
of Early Christianity with a rereading of the Post-Enlightenment era which refuses the 
marginalization of theology that provides the best toolkit for addressing the issues at 
hand.  
The argument begins with an elaboration of tools useful to the eventual 
understanding of the thesis. From a discussion of the assumptions of modern sciences 
“fact” and the way they work to produce theories I will consider how this defines terms 
in the rest of the text. With that in hand I will find an antagonistic yet helpful partner in 
Daniel Dennett, especially in his Multiple Draft Model of consciousness. Known as a 
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vocal supporter of the New Atheism movement his overall thought is rooted in a rabid 
materialism and will be resisted but his critiques of Cartesian dualism in both material 
and immaterial forms are not only insightful but have reached a wider audience than 
other eliminative materialist
3
 philosophers owing to his popular publications and as such 
require a response more urgently. The theory of consciousness sketched out in 
Dennett’s book Consciousness Explained and other writings will form the second section 
of the first chapter. With that theoretical framework I will shift to the second chapter 
outlining the debate in the PFN and show how the battle fought by Hacker and Bennet 
should be a cautionary tale for Christians engaged in thinking about the mind/soul and 
validate my choice of Dennett as a productive theorist. 
The third section briefly examines another theory of mind that one encounters in 
contemporary Christian scholarship, which has replaced old models of dualism with 
another model that posits the existence of an irreducible mind-construct in a school of 
thought loosely grouped under the name Emergentism. By highlighting that Christian 
philosophers and New Testament scholars hold views that are structurally similar to 
Hacker and Bennett’s assertion that the brain and the mind ought not to be conflated I 
will show that these Christian accounts of the self are open to the same type of criticism 
as Dennett offers. 
The last section is the most original. After the examination of Dennett’s attacks 
on the concept of Mind as separate category not reducible to biology and using his 
assault on the PFN to highlight the dangers faced by Christians who propose similar 
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ways of understanding the self, I will read the Bible through Dennettian eyes. Perhaps 
the reason this is so novel is Dennett’s rabid atheism causes many to foreclose 
prematurely on all of his academic work.  Analogically, the move is akin to a midnight 
raid an enemy camp for materiel rather than a diplomatic encounter; certain of his ideas 
are extremely problematic for any theist and it would be foolish to assume that his 
entire project could be made congruent with Scripture. Nevertheless his MDM allows us 
to resist dualism while still giving a cogent account of a Biblical conception of the self, 
especially in reading the letters of Paul.  
Understanding that Christianity has always been called to stand apart from the 
world but never ignorant of it I will propose that the Dennettian understanding of 
consciousness found in the Multiple Draft Model be accepted and analysed from a 
Christian perspective. Dennett asserts that his MDM is able to solve problems which 
cannot be answered by mind/body dualist philosophies and this same MDM provides 
clarity in understanding the various terms for the self used by Paul. This model which 
asserts the holistic view of the human person sans “ghost in the machine” is congruent 
with Scripture and furthermore the perpetual flux within such a consciousness is can be 
used to provide an analogical grammar of sanctification wherein competing mental 
routines are brought into harmony with one another. This will point to a larger dialogue 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis that would see a reinvigoration of an 
understanding of the soul that has its kernel in the Augustinian tripartite distinction of 





Anywhere you look within the field of scientific enquiry, or any discipline which 
purports to have explanatory powers, there are theories. They are a part of a taxonomy 
of ideas which attempts to explain the way the world works assuming normal causation 
of events
4
. At the base of this taxonomy is the simple fact; these are singular units of 
knowledge that give us information about something. The simplest of facts are so basic 
we often take them for granted. Thus we say that “Rome is a city in the European nation 
of Italy.” and call it a fact. What we really saying is that: there is such a thing as a city, 
there is such a thing as a nation, it is possible to delineate portions on the world into 
political units, there is a large unit which we name Europe, a smaller subset of this unit is 
called Italy, etc. Even this does not begin to delve into the “facts” involved in the 
transmission of such a fact through language or a printed medium. Our description of 
Rome is actually a composite fact and generally speaking when we are talking about 
facts this is what we mean. The end goal of all human academic disciplines is to attempt 
to make sense of some composite facts and try to find ways they interrelate. The 
attempt to explain the interrelation is colloquially called a theory, but is more precisely 
known as a hypothesis at the outset. As an example I could hypothesize that if I wore a 
particular pair of socks three days in a row and on each of those three days it rained 
then I was wearing special rainmaking socks. This hypothesis is almost akin to a thought 
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experiment, it is an untested and unproven theory and as any statistician will remind 
you; correlation is not the same as causality. If on the fourth day, despite the 
protestations of my nostrils, I wore the same socks and then it did not in fact rain I 
would be forced to reconsider my hypothesis. If however on the fourth day and every 
day thereafter that I wore my socks it then proceeded to rain and yet on the days that I 
decided to not wear my socks it did not rain, then my hypothesis would make the 
semantic shift into a theory. Theories have explanatory powers which have been borne 
out by testing and are not contradictory to the facts available to the theorist. That is not 
to say that they are ironclad truths, perhaps upon further refinement of my testing it 
was determined that when I put my left sock on first it rained but by putting on my right 
sock it did not. This would lead to a revision of the theory which, although it does not 
completely falsify the first theory nor did it enshrine the new theory as absolute truth.  
At the heart of this idea of refinement is the kernel of what a fact is. In a modern 
sense and especially within scientific empiricism it is coterminous with truth or objective 
reality. It is what Alasdair McIntyre refers to as the mechanist view of fact, it is a neutral 
description of affairs in which “…’is’ becomes stranger to ‘ought’
5
. This was not always 
so: the OED neatly tracks this cultural shift in its sparse but profound entry on the word 
as “a thing that is known or proved to be true” while also stating that its earliest use was 
actually a forensic term for an act or crime. The reason it existed as a legal term was 
that a condition for its validity was its verifiability; that is if something could not be 
proven by verification it was inadmissible in court proceedings.  
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As a fact is concretized through repeated verification the best it can hope for is 
to approach truth asymptotically but with the possibility of total revision always an 
option. The asymptotic nature of this type of truth is still found in the instructions given 
to juries which ask them to decide “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant is 
guilty.  To state this again, in the modern sense a fact is a fact by virtue of its verifiability 
not its actual relation to any abstract absolute. In addition to the necessity of its 
verifiability a fact is now a unit of absolute truth rather than a useful juridical term as it 
was in its origins. Factual knowledge was at one point not coterminous with absolute 
truth and actually defined in part by its own contingency. 
Christian thinkers outside fundamentalist circles have resisted accommodation 
of the modern idea of fact into their thought precisely because it overemphasizes 
verifiability as a pre-condition for truthfulnes. As a Catholic example Bernard Lonergan’s 
writings show the tension; his work Insight seeks to examine not just knowledge of 
things, but knowledge of knowledge, insight into insight
6
 and so we would expect to find 
there a discussion of the concept.  Lonergan characterizes method of his project, that of 
inquiry in to the nature of insight as something that “…is both concrete and practical, 
and the motives for undertaking its execution resides, not in the realm of easy 
generalities, but in the difficult domain of matters of fact.”
7
 (Emphasis mine). In a 
project that uses this vocabulary of the material it would be natural to assume that not 
only the method but also the domain would be well defined but later Lonergan himself 
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asks “But what is fact? What is the clear precise definitive, irrevocable, dominant 
something that we name fact? The question is too large to be settled here.
8
” Reading 
this in a book that stretches to over 700 pages can be disheartening; if it is too large for 
this book to handle perhaps it is unanswerable. But only a few lines down the same 
page Lonergan tells us that fact is “concrete”, “intelligible” it “possesses conditional 
necessity”, and it is “the natural objective of human cognitional processes”.  The 
supposed dichotomy between these two statements collapses in light of Lonergan’s 
overall project which holds “The foundations on which science relies are not a set of 
self-evident premises or of necessary and eternal truths. What the scientist relies on 
ultimately is his method.”
9
  So he does not dwell on the concept of fact and instead 
looks at how we can know a fact when we see one, or more specifically describes the 
conditions for the judgement of fact which is couched in a method.  
Lonergan concerns himself with the apprehension of facts and not their entire 
nature.  Nevertheless he understands the temptation to reduce his position to one of 
pure materialism and cautions that “If existence is a mere matter of fact, it is nothing…If 
it is a mere matter of fact that we know and that there are to be known classical and 
statistical laws…then both the knowing and the known are nothing.
10
” The fact is 
ultimately a discrete descriptive tool which is separate from the explanatory function of 
Being in Insight. The refusal to limit the nature of a fact to a sort of eternal and self-
evident datum demonstrates the orthodox position from which Christianity has resisted 
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philosophies of materialism. We can acquire knowledge of reality definitively, but never 
exhaustively because apprehension of the infinite cannot be abstracted from the finite.   
For philosophical systems not requiring and indeed hostile to such a metaphysical 
system of abstract beliefs the descriptive power of the fact itself becomes reified.  
 This reification of fact is a methodological assumption underpinning the writings 
of Daniel Dennett and arguably most strands of materialism. It is nearly hegemonic 
within Western scientific discourse but is not necessarily so
11
. For Dennett a fact is an 
empirical value which has been demonstrated by sound scientific verification; 
importantly a fact is not necessarily true or false prior to this scientific verification. Since 
belief in a “fact” apprehended by our senses or transmitted through language occurs on 
a personal level, the risk exists that barring any external set of absolutes any and all 
facts about the world become permanently relativized. The German phenomenologist’s 
project was to take as a common starting point the universal understanding of 
introspection but although the all hoped to achieve internal universals not unlike those 
of Descartes, their results were quite divergent. The solution to the diversity of first 
person phenomenologies for Dennett is to allow every interaction between a person 
and the outside world to exist within a heterophenomenological world
12
.  
In Dennett’s eyes, this is a world not unlike that used by an anthropologist to 
achieve insight into another culture. If an indigenous tribesman were to state that a 
plant had divine healing properties we would not need to believe along with the 
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tribesman that the plant was divine but we could accurately describe his beliefs, in other 
words we could give a factual account of his beliefs. However if after scientific testing 
the plant was indeed determined to have curative properties then we could make an 
objective fact statement based upon scientific evidence. The heterophenomenological 
world lets us bracket our perceptions of the world (what someone says to us, what 
colour we see in a painting, the intentions we impute to someone holding a knife) and 
allows them to be analyzed
13
. Heterophenomenology is important because it gives value 
to the internal thoughts and mental workings of other individuals in a way which can 
still be objectively studied. It can then take that data and attempt to test it against 
previously verified information from other sources (other tribesman, historical accounts 
from around the world, etc.) and attempt to create universalize the personal world. 
Thus through verification we can know the meaning of the words, the colour of the 
painting or the intentions of the knife wielder. From this a verified account of 
heterophenomena can be used in the judicious creating of theories which explain on a 
super personal level the beliefs and actions of the individual
14
. 
So Lonergan’s concept of fact begins with the personal apprehension of a thing 
which results in an evaluation that asks “it is so?” while Dennett sees the reliance on 
personal apprehension as suspect. He does so by tracing a story through German 
phenomenology showing ostensibly how the project to discover truths abstracted from 
personal thoughts failed. So he creates the concept of Heterophenomenology to allow 
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for an external verification of these truths which is supposed to leave some value for 
internal life of an individual. But Dennett is forced into this position by his materialism 




 The word theory (Gr. Θεωρία) has a long history in the western philosophical 
tradition, appearing in the writings of Pythagoras and some of the pre-Socratics as a way 
of thinking about the natural world. It has special meaning in the writings of Aristotle 
that are instructive for us. In the Metaphysics he was the first to contrast theorizing with 
praxis/techne, both of which are mental activities.
16
 The objects of theoretical thought 
are things which are immutable constants (e.g. gravity, the laws of thermodynamics) 
and the purpose of this theorizing is actually the enjoyment derived from the pursuit 
itself; for this reason theorizing ought to be done as a leisure activity.
17
   Praxis/techne 
on the other hand is knowledge sought towards a particular end and is characterized by 
action rather than leisurely contemplation. If I ask myself “How do the electrical 
receptors in a person’s limbic system relate to hormonal output?” I am making an 
enquiry framed as pure knowledge. Praxis, because it is teleological and has as its goal 
the shaping of behaviour or of society, frames its questions differently. It focuses on 
using deductive reasoning more than the induction of theorizing. A question of praxis 
related to the first would be how can I better control hormonal output in a person’s 
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body? Such a question has a stated goal, but also an end. It does not say “let’s see what 
happens” but “how can we change something else or ourselves?” Through Aquinas 
praxis becomes important for Christians as well since it describes the process of 
divinization a work in the lives of Christians. Paul tells early churches that they must 
become like Christ through imitation either of his example (Gal 4:12, 2Th 3:7) or the 
ultimate example, Christ (Eph. 5:1). Thus my intent is one of praxis; for although this 
thesis considers theories, it does so specifically with the goal of turning those theories 
towards practical ends. 
 I have outlined two separate ideas here, one being the taxonomy of ideas 
(fact/hypothesis/theory) and the other the nature of theory in order to highlight a 
problem in the modern crisis which is our understanding of the self, and particular the 
purportedly immaterial part of the self which is usually labeled as the soul or 
consciousness. Until very recently the facts (in the modern sense) available to humanity 
regarding the conscious experience have been very sparse and consisted of deductions 
from philosophy with a few brute examples of pre-modern science. Trepanning, a 
pseudo-medical procedure which involves drilling a small whole in the skull, has been 
evidenced in the archaeological record since the Neolithic period and lends credence to 
the idea that there was an intuitive connection between the brain and what we call 
“mental” states.
18
 It was only with the development of modern medicine that the study 
of the brains functions came into its own. To be more precise, in the last decade of the 
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 century a Spanish pathologist, Santiago Cajal, was the first to demonstrate that the 
brain was made up of cells. This more than anything marks the beginning of 
contemporary neuroscience. 
  For the student of religion it is important to know the background in order enter 
the debate using the same language as our interlocutors. The naturalistic method 
prevalent in modern scientific inquiry seeks to expunge any supernatural account of 
human consciousness and if (this is the big if of the neuroscientific endeavour
19
) the soul 
is related to the mind which springs from the brain then the supernaturalist is being 
painted into a corner by science. If our understanding of the mind goes out the window 
than seemingly the soul will as well. The fear which I have just outlined, that if the soul 
cannot be found or if the soul was tied up with a thing which can no longer be said to 
exist, is a by-product of thinking in dualist terms and as we shall see Paul does not think 
in dualist terms but aspectual. The fact that science assumes a naturalistic methodology 
in the quest to understand he mind is not an inherently negative thing, but when 
theorizers extrapolate from scientific methodology a general framework of the world, 
then the theist must protest. In his book Darwin’s Pious Idea Connor Cunningham 
defines the distinction as a choice between methodological and ontological 
materialism
20
. Methodological materialism is the decision to bracket off accounts of the 
supernatural world for the purpose of more accurately describing physical phenomena. 
This move is at the heart of the scientific method and is in essence treats the field of 
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study as a control group that assumes no interference from supernatural causes. 
Ontological naturalism goes beyond this and claims “…not only that science must stick 
to what we take to be natural but also that the natural is all there is, indeed all there 
ever could be.”
21
 This is the operative principle in the Dennett’s thinking.  
Prominent in both popular and academic settings our subject has been a vocal 
part of the consciousness debate for decades. Dr. Daniel Dennett is the Austin B. 
Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and the Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies 
at Tufts University. He received his doctorate from Oxford University where he studied 
under Gilbert Ryle whose 1949 book The Concept of Mind was at the forefront of the 
20
th
 century assault on dualism and who coined the term “Ghost in the Machine” to 
deride the popular understanding of the mind
22
. Ryle’s student took up the same fight 
and has written extensively on non-dualistic accounts of the mind and several fields 
related to philosophy of mind including AI networking and cognitive modelling. Dennett 
is also cited as an evangelical atheist and frequently referenced as one of the “Four 
Horseman of the New Atheism” along with Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and the late 
Christopher Hitchens
23
. His writing is lucid even when dealing with very technical 
subjects, which has earned him a large following at a popular level. His attacks on 
Cartesian models of the self have led him to propose an alternative called the Multiple 
Drafts Model which seeks to expunge the idea that the mind contains a Cartesian 
theatre, the antiquated notion of a central location in front of which all sensory data is 
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paraded. The need for such an alternative model, Dennett argues, arises because our 
prevailing models presuppose a dualistic self that are not congruent with modern 
neuroscience. Prior to the 20
th
 century almost all knowledge of the mind was deductive, 
including the information available to Descartes. Now that neuroscience permits the 
inductive examination of the brain it renders Cartesian dualism incoherent and we must 
avoid hiding deductive models of consciousness inside scientific language. 
 
A Failure of Intuitive Explanations 
Our experience of consciousness is full of things that seem to have no 
quantifiable properties, the blue-ness of the sky and the smell of fresh bread were until 
recently unassailable realities that lived in a mental world about which science had little 
to say. Dennett’s eliminative materialism is unwilling to admit the quale as an entirely 
subjective mental event and as such is well placed within the enlightenment tradition. 
The fact that science could say little about the inner workings of consciousness 
has been a contributing factor to a dualistic interpretation of reality which, though a 
common feature of Greek and Hellenistic thought re-emerges in the Western 
intellectual tradition during the period of the Scientific Revolution. It is no coincidence 
that Descartes writes the Discourse on Method under the influence of Bacon’s Novum 
Organum. Bacon’s works were written in an academic climate seeking to throw off the 
overly mystical tendencies of scholasticism and his methods sought to replace appeals 
to revelation with a method for producing verifiable truths. In essence, through the 
22 
 
programmatic removal of idols of the mind Bacon hoped to attain knowledge more 
certain than had been possible since before the fall
24
. Mental activities were not 
amenable to the type reasoning proposed by the Baconian project and Descartes 
separation of mind and body allowed ones conscious self to remain a distinct, unique 
thing in the face of vulgar empiricism. The world of the self was filled with sky gazing 
and bread smelling, and the physical world was where bodies were born, grew old and 
died. Descartes begins the Meditations by asking us to start our search for knowledge by 
imagining that there is no natural world in an effort to sequester the quest for self-
knowledge away from the project of Bacon
25
. The result was an intuitive description of 
the mental life that stood independent of the body yet was still conjoined. In the mind a 
person does not think “we ought to do this” or “my arms ought to move thus” and then 
it happens. What we experience is some sort of unity of thought and agency that has led 
us to posit that the cause must be the same as the perceived effect. Descartes model 




 century modern neuroscience began to change this reliance on a 
Cartesian deductive explanation of consciousness with the discovery of inductive 
insights.. The seat of our conscious experience had long been considered the brain
26
 and 
Descartes himself thought the immaterial soul/body juncture was located in the brain’s 
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pineal gland. Instructive here is the fact that Descartes and all others who followed after 
him required a meeting point between the material and immaterial self to be located in 
the physical realm.  Their methodology ran counter to earlier explanations that have 
come to us through Patristic teachings and the Old Testament concept of self as 
nephesh that saw the physical intermingled rather than hitched at a point with the 
divine. The need to find a connection between the mental and the physical has always 
been the greatest question at the heart of dualist metaphysics and as shown below, in 
Chapter 3 once physical connections are ruled out, metaphysical ones are posited.  
Research into the workings of the brain hoped to explain the relation of the 
conscious experience to its biological underpinnings, but in doing so it also highlighted 
the non-uniform nature of the brain. There was no mystical connector at the pineal 
gland or elsewhere. The singular organ “brain” is composed of dozens of constituent 
parts, the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, medulla oblongata, etc. and although it 
demonstrates bilateral symmetry this by no means makes the centre of the brain the 
centre of thought.   Through experimentation which was at first clumsy and dangerous 
neuroscientists determined that different sections of the brain were responsible for 
processing different stimuli and regulating different bodily functions. Thus the medulla 
controls autonomic physical activities, personality traits and the executive function have 




Even more surprising is the way in which the brain seems to be constructed in a 
way that demonstrates its own evolution. Autonomic nerve functions are controlled in 
the basal ganglia which colloquially is called the “reptilian brain”. Our olfactory sense is 
most likely our oldest sensory system and bypasses the thalamus as it provides the rest 
of the brain with data which is why smells can seem so primal and evocative
27
. Given 
that the brain seems to be an artefact which plots evolutionary paths it could be 
assumed that a recent biological change could be linked to the recent evolutionary 
emergence of consciousness. But there has been no demonstration of a definitive 
source of the conscious experience in a particular part of the brain. There is no part of 
the brain which can be said to control self-reflection, no one point to which all 
information flows and no demonstrable way in which qualia can be distinguished by 
their physical correlates. 
 A working definition of this term should be given since it figures in the debate. 
Dennett defines qualia as “an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more 
familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us.”
28
 A more general definition is “what 
something is like”. In relation to the conscious experience the qualia of existence is 
argued to be intrinsic to the thing which exists, and unable to be experienced by others. 
Thomas Nagel popularized this idea in his paper "What is it like to be a Bat?" wherein he 
states “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the 
subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available 
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conception gives us a clue how this could be done”
29
  The inherently subjective nature 
of qualia has made it fuel for poets and artists; qualia is the intoxication of lovers whose 
overwhelming feelings cannot be expressed; the feeling of being in love is not like the 
definition of love. The inability to understand the qualia of experience, especially the 
qualia of consciousness, is a by-product of privileging the first person perspective in 
philosophy which Dennett counters with his heterophenomenology. As a materialist, 
Dennett believes that in order for qualia to be intelligible at all in philosophic discourse 
they must be mental events which are also factical. It is something that must be so and 
if the sensory feel of qualia is not infallible (have precise neural equivalents) then it must 
be nonsensical. To flesh out a refutation of the intelligibility of qualia Dennett uses a 




 The greatest importance of the multiplicity of the brains functions for us is that 
the previously held theory of the unity of the mind as a decision making conscious entity 
has been falsified. Research on split-brain phenomena done by Roger Sperry and 
Michael Gazzaniga has shown that each brain hemisphere can demonstrate agency 
independent of the other. There appears to be no Cartesian theatre in which our minds 
review all of the sensory data it receives and from which commands are given to our 
body to act upon the world. But is this a problem?  It is for the theist because it would 
seem to be a denial of one of the few remaining realms in which there is room for the 
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immaterial to have any influence on our material selves. The Multiple Drafts Model of 
Dennett is a thoroughly materialistic theory which accounts for mental phenomena that 
are not able to be explained by traditional dualist theories of consciousness.  His theory 
is based upon new facts about the physical makeup of our minds, but if we refer to our 
taxonomy of ideas we can see that the MDM does not necessarily become a fact in itself 
by virtue of its explanatory powers. What it does is attempt to arrange facts in a logical 
sequence that allows for further information to be extracted, fulfilling the same function 
intellectually that an algorithm would mathematically. I will now briefly show a model of 
Cartesian dualism as traditionally understood and then explain the Multiple Drafts 
Model and how it was created in response to modern scientific discovery over and 
against Cartesian dualism. It will be this MDM that will help us read the Bible in a new 
way which remains theologically coherent. The non-monist model of consciousness can 
also supply a grammar that allows us to read more clearly Paul’s non monist description 
of the person, making sense out of the possibly confusing mind/body/soul and 
flesh/spirit language. The similarities in the conscious experience and the classical 
Christian interpretations of the Divine framework of the Trinity can also be productive 
for speaking about the immaterial nature of the soul as it relates to the mind. 
 
Dualism as traditionally understood 
If while reading this you, the reader, consider yourself you are performing the 
most basic type of self-reflection. The mental loop of “I am thinking about thinking 
27 
 
about myself” seems to be unique to humans and the possibility for this action is at the 
heart of the conscious experience, and the primary reality which lead Descartes to 
formulate his dualist framework.  
I next considered attentively what I was; and I saw that while I could 
pretend that I had no body, that there was no world, and no place for me 
to be in, I could not pretend that I was not; on the contrary, from the mere 
fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things it evidently and 
certainly followed that I existed. On the other hand, if I had merely ceased 
to think, even if everything else that I had ever imagined had been true, I 
had no reason to believe that I should have existed. From this I recognized 
that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think and 




The thinking place is where the experiencing of life happens and also where the 
appreciating of the qualia of life happens. Cartesian dualism required a locus for thought 
because while on the one hand it was obvious that humans were thinking creatures on 
the other the body clearly participated in the physical nature of the world. Descartes 
stands at the beginning of the modern period for a reason; he was the first important 
figure to assail the Aristotelian underpinnings of scholasticism which was a rejection of 
substantial forms as explanatory principles in physics. Within this framework, humans 
are composed of a primary substance that is not strictly matter, though just what 
constitutes the primary substance is an ongoing debate
32
 what is certain is that the 
substance was purposively arranged.  A substantial form was thought to be an 
immaterial principle of material organization that resulted in a particular thing of a 
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certain kind. The main principle of substantial forms was to provide an explanation for 
the final cause or purpose of being that kind of thing
33
.  The problem with the 
substantial form model for Descartes was that it was tautological. Look at the bird we 
call the chickadee. The substantial form of the chickadee unites with primary substance 
so as to organize it for the sake of being a chickadee type of bird. This also means that 
any faculties the chickadee has by virtue of being that kind of thing is ultimately 
explained by the goal or final cause of being a chickadee. This is why it is proper for a 
chickadee to fly, because in flying it becomes more like the substantial form. In this 
account, a chickadee flies for the sake of being a chickadee and not because it needs to 
transport itself. Although this might be true, it does not say anything new or useful 
about chickadees and can be seen as the logical outcome of thinking in terms of Θεωρία 
which we saw above. So it seemed to Descartes that Scholastic philosophy and science 
was incapable of discovering any new or useful knowledge.  
The new inductive method of Bacon took as its first premises the observable 
fact, not the immaterial substance which produced the fact. Seizing on the explanatory 
powers of this method Descartes saw an opportunity to advance his own work. In the 
Sixth Replies, Descartes uses a substantialist explanation of gravity as it existed in 
objects like rocks to highlight the illogical nature of the Scholastics
34
. As Aristotle would 
have it the end of being a stone was a tendency to move toward the center of the earth; 
this explanation implies that the stone has knowledge of this goal, where the centre of 
                                                           
33
 Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy “Rene Descartes: The Mind-Body Distinction” 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/mindbodydesc.html.   May 3, 2006  
34
 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. 1 pp.182-183 
29 
 
the earth is and how to get there. But surely a rock cannot know this since a rock is not a 
res cogitans. Following this example: 
1. A person is a physical thing,  
2. it is not proper to a physical thing to have immaterial qualities such as 
the ability to think 
3. A person can think. 
4. Therefore there must exist within a person an element which is capable 
of thought 
5. A person is not only a physical thing, but both a physical and non-
physical thing. 
 
The theory is predicated on assumptions about the way the mind works which were 
arrived at deductively. As our taxonomy showed us, theories are built out of the facts 
that underpin them. The realm of facts about the mind available to Descartes was 
almost entirely deductive in origins whereas the methods of Bacons’ scientific project 
were inductive and more importantly, hugely productive. The redefinition of the self in 
dualist terms by Descartes was a heroic effort to carve out a space in which to analyse 
the mind deductively in order to keep our understanding of the immaterial mental 
world moving apace with the newly invigorated inductive science of Bacon. However 
neuroscience is now finally able to provide us with inductively derived facts about the 
brain, and taken together it seems that we are being forced to reconsider the monist 
account of an immaterial thinker. 
A problem with stimuli interpretation 
30 
 
Dennett breaks down monadic consciousness using several examples, but the 
most in depth one is the Phi experiment of Kolers and Grunau in 1976.
35
 The test which 
was originally put to psychologists by philosophers involves a subject looking at two 
lights which flash in quick succession which were only a few inches apart and of 
different colours. When the speed of the flashing reached a certain point, they became 
indistinguishable as two separate lights and instead looked like one light that oscillated 
between the two points. The remarkable part of the findings was that at the halfway 
point between the two light points the colour of the perceived moving light changed. If 
the lights are red and green, then they were not consciously being experienced as red-
green-red-green but as red-red turning into green-green-green turning into red-red…  
If
36
 this is how we were experiencing things in a Cartesian sense then Dennett 
contends the mind must function either in an Orwellian or Stalinesque way. Orwellian in 
the sense that the past can be rewritten in order to accommodate new data (as in 
George Orwell’s 1984) Stalinesque in the sense that the mind can doctor evidence and 
create false testimony (As in the show trials of Stalin’s USSR). Regardless of how we are 
being fooled, we would not know how we are being fooled because it happens on such a 
small time scale as to be indistinguishable from actual reality. What is common to both 
possible ways in which the mind is being tricked is that there are things happening in the 
brain which happen unconsciously that impinge on the conscious perception of reality. 
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Only with the advent of precise diagnostic equipment can we see through this biological 
spin doctoring, or exploit it as this experiment did, in order to learn something new 
about the mind. The problem with this is that there is no definite point at which the 
unconscious doctoring of our senses makes the transition to a conscious state. The lack 
of a definite point creates an infinite regress as we try to find the exact moment we 
become conscious of something. The absurdity of the infinite regress is in part what 
causes Dennett to call for a new model. 
Overview of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness 
As an alternative explanation for the Phi experiments interesting findings, 
Dennett suggests we see sensory data as interpreted by the brain as immediately 
available. Each of the brains constituent parts is processing data which it receives from 
the senses or from other parts of the brain. What happens to that data is not unlike the 
collaborative creation of something like a movie script. Different copies of information 
are floating around inside our heads and being processed simultaneously.  
Visual stimuli evoke trains of events in the cortex that gradually yield 
discriminations of greater and greater specificity. At different times and 
different places, various “decisions” or “judgements” are made; more 
literally, parts of the brain are caused to go into states that discriminate 
different features, e.g. first mere onset of stimulus, then location, then 
shape…These localized discriminative states transmit effects to other 
places, contributing to further discriminations…Where does it all come 
together? The answer is: nowhere. Some of these distributed contentful 
states soon die out, leaving no further traces. Others do leave traces, on 
subsequent verbal reports of experience and memory…But there is no 
32 
 
one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in 




Dennett’s preferred metaphor for this type of thinking is the stream of consciousness 
rather than a theatre. Different elements of the brain build upon the simplest of stimuli 
to formulate more complex representations in our auditory, spatial, and visual 
processors. The information is then spun together in a way that creates the possibility of 
self-awareness but never solidifying into a single account of all sensory data. 
Consciousness more precisely is a state of affairs rather than a thing which exists. Within 
that state of affairs no one discriminative state, no one mental content is the final judge 
of all information. 
 How does this theory explain for our apparent self-awareness? Dennett turns to 
a common thought experiment, zombies. The philosophers’ zombie has no desire to eat 
brains, but is identical to a human being in every way it acts, moves, and speaks. What is 
different is that the zombie is not conscious of its actions. Even if asked to speak on their 
conscious experience, a zombie could use an unconscious state to call on a different 
subconscious sub-routine to provide stock answers that are learned through 
enculturation
38
. Supposedly even the plausibility of a zombie’s existence is a denial of 
pure physicalism, but if we accept the traditional zombie argument Dennett says we 
must also accept a similar mental creature, which Dennett calls a zimboe. The Zimboe is 
an evolved zombie that as a result of self-monitoring has internal but unconscious 
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higher order informational states that are about its other lower order informational 
states.
39
 As such the information we can posit about a zimboe from a 
heterophenomenological stance is the same as that of a zombie. The inversion of the 
supposed properties of the zombie makes the thought experiment nonsensical; that is it 
can no longer be said to tell us anything special about the possession of conscious 
mental states. The description of a zimboe is the same as that of a normal human being. 
 MDM is accused of being a description of the way subjects report events, and 
with this Dennett would agree but he would not see it as a criticism. His a priori beliefs 
that the brain and the mind are coterminous do not create a conflict in this statement; 
how the brain works is what the mind is. The work he has done in providing a grammar 
of mental activity that is informed by the facts of neurological function is helpful, and 
we will continue to look at specific terms and experiments which show the non-uniform 
nature of the brain. In the second section I will engage the challenges to the conflation 
of the brain and the mind which are myriad and come from both inductive 
(neuroscience) and deductive (Christian Analytic philosophy) fields of study. Section two 
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Chapter 2 – Cautionary Tale 
 
In the first section I have shown that there has been a shift in the understanding 
of the nature of the human being in the last century that has in large part been 
informed by the discoveries of neuroscience. The assault on dualism led by Gilbert Ryle 
and others culminated in the modern denial by Ryle’s disciple Daniel Dennett of the 
singular rational monad that is called either the self, or more commonly/by extension 
(and importantly for our inquiry) the soul. This discourse filters down from the academic 
to the practical world first through scientific popularisers and journalists until at a non-
technical level it becomes embedded in our everyday language. The work of Dennett is 
not hegemonic, nor is it without its own critics both academic and popular. Of particular 
note is the lively debate encountered between Dennett and the authors of the first 
major collaborative work to examine the interrelation of philosophy and neuroscience. 
Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (PFN) was published in 2003 by Blackwell and 
its authors come from the two fields discussed; Maxwell Bennett is a prominent 
neuroscientist and Chair at the University of Sydney, Australia and Peter Hacker who is 
one of the foremost authorities on Wittgenstein and was a professor at St. John’s 
College, Oxford until his retirement in 2006.  
Their book caused a great controversy and was particular critical of the 
philosophic influence of Daniel Dennett and John Searle on the neuroscientific debate, 
so much so that the critiques in the book led to a debate between Dennett and Hacker 
35 
 
as a keynote session of the American Philosophical Society in 2005 as a part of their 
Authors and Critics series which was chaired by Owen Flanagan, himself a prominent 
voice in the field. That debate produced another book entitled Neuroscience & 
Philosophy: Brain, Mind and Language. It is especially on these two texts that this 
section will rely. By looking at this debate as an external observer we can see how 
theology can benefit from learning a new vocabulary for the purpose of illustration and 
understanding, and also that the conflict embroiling neuroscience has parallels with the 
issues surrounding soul-talk. 
In the Companion Bennett and Hacker argue against what they see as a gross 
conceptual error in the language of neuroscientists, that is, the problem which 
neuroscientists encounter is an a priori mistake that affects their ability to frame 
experiments
40
. Put simply, conceptual questions which are the province of philosophy 
are a matter of sense/nonsense. Empirical questions on the other hand are matters of 
truth/falsehood and are the proper domain of science. B & H admit that it may seem 
strange that the entire discipline of neuroscience is predicated on false assumptions, 
especially given the advances made in the field. Nevertheless they draw comparisons to 
other conceptual problems with hypotheses that had been au courant in their day. 
Attempts to explain combustion by positing the mysterious substance phlogiston in the 
17
th
 century and the similar luminiferous ether of the 19
th
 century were both theories 
held in flourishing periods of their respective disciplines
41
. These theories were based on 
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false premises and were incapable of advancing science (except through their 
refutation) because they were nonsense. 
  The conceptual error that Bennett and Hacker wish to address most strongly is 
the tendency to recreate the Cartesian materialism which we saw in chapter 1
42
 At first 
glance it would seem that their work should complement rather than conflict with 
Dennett’s theories of mind since as we saw he proposed the MDM precisely to address 
lingering Cartesian materialism. Dennett admits their shared goal in his eventual 
rebuttals
43
 but the similarities end there. The divide is not in between body and mind 
anymore in latent dualism; instead it is in between body and brain although much of the 
same terminology is used
44
. Verbs like believe, think, decide, or map,  while traditionally 
were actions only ascribed to a human being, are now capabilities ascribed to the brain. 
So it is the brain that makes decisions, the brain that decides on which actions to take, 
and the brain that makes classifications. This is the level to which the problem has 





generation neuroscientists who were the first to throw off dualism) Now with diagnostic 
tools of greater precision the fallacy is not just to say that the brain can think, act or 
discriminate but that individual parts of the brain can do these things. 
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 The conceptual problem is in the mind of Hacker and Bennett a manifestation of 
the merelogical fallacy, that is ascribing a quality to a part that is really only appropriate 
to ascribe to the whole.  They hold that “the mind is neither a substance distinct from 
the brain nor a substance identical with the brain”
45
 (Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience 2003). For those in the camp of Hacker and Bennet it is 
more proper to speak of the whole individual; it is not the body that has a brain, but a 
human being who has a body and in that body a brain. The brain and its activities make 
it possible for us – not it – to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and 
pursue projects.”
46
 This idea demonstrates the reliance on Wittgensteinian theories of 
identity which forms the basis of Hackers critique of Dennett. Indeed in Dennett’s 
rebuttal he points out that the linchpin of PFN is a statement of Wittgenstein.  
It comes to this: Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves 
like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind; 




So the conceptual problem is merelogical in the eyes of Hacker and Bennett who feel 
that neuroscience had been co-opting the language of psychology, which speaks about 
the mind of an individual, and applying it to the brain in a lazy manoeuvre which 
basically cribs from the hard work done by psychologists.  
                                                           
45
 M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) 
p.26 
46
 N & P p. 134 
38 
 
 Dennett’s reaction to their accusation is to say that what they call a fallacy is 
already explained by his intentional stance
47
. Although not strictly a part of his 
philosophy of mind, Dennett’s stances are related to his theory of 
Heterophenomenology which we saw earlier. The intentional stance is the highest of 
three levels in an epistemological taxonomy and each of the levels (or stances) are 
useful for determining the properties of an object and how they will behave. To be clear 
they are not modes of being, but perspectives from which an external observer can 
examine things, be they lumps of coal or complex organisms.  At the most basic level of 
thinking about an object is the physical stance which deals with the physics and 
chemistry of a thing. Understanding the molecular structure of water, its viscosity and 
density are examples of inquiries into waters nature from the physical stance. The 
second level of understanding is the design stance which is concerned with engineering 
and biology.  
We take a design stance when we assume that water will flow down a vertical 
pipe, conforming to the shape of the pipe and obeying the law of gravity. But what if 
there is water in a pipe and instead of slowing down the water is actually travelling up? 
Considering the situation solely from a design point of view will not help us if the water 
is superheated and rising in the form of steam. Information about the waters physical 
state is only available through the physical stance. Note also that the stance is 
something taken by the observer, not a property inherent in the object. This is 
important for Dennett because without a reflexive “I” the best way to know something 
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is not in fact through introspection but attempts by an external observer positioned in 
various stances to determine the nature, design or intentions of a thing.  
 Seeing the simple leap from physical to design in action it is easier to 
understand the leap that Dennett sees at work in the mind when he moves from the 
design to the intentional stance.  
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behaviour 
is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that 
agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you 
figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and 
finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the 
light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs 
and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent 




The brain is made up of trillions of molecules which have conglomerated to form 
billions of cells. Here the physical has made the leap to the design through the genomic 
blueprints found in DNA. The intentional stance at the top of the taxonomy is concerned 
with our ability to make predictions about the brains subsystems on an intentional level. 
First an example of the intentional stance: Suppose that you predict that a person, call 
her Sharon, will put down a book and go to the kitchen and make a sandwich. The 
intentional stance would make this prediction based on the facts that Sharon has just 
finished reading the book, it is lunch time and Sharon has not eaten since breakfast. The 
activities of Sharon are predicated upon her being a rational agent (The intentional 
stance could not account for Sharon running outside, tearing up clods of dirt and 
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showering herself with them while humming tunes from My Fair Lady because this 
would be an irrational act) and rationality can only be determined by repeated 
observance of similar actions taken by agents in similar physical/cultural contexts.  
Recall the quote from Wittgenstein mentioned above that underpins the whole 
argument of Hacker and Bennett. “Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves 
like) a human being can it be said…it is conscious.” (Emphasis mine) The crux of the 
conflict between Hacker/Bennett and Dennett/Searle crystallizes around this statement 
because the latter hold that the brain and more specifically subsections of the brain do 
behave like people. 
 While it is true that complete decision making is only done by a person, 
something very much like deciding, like mapping is done by a subsystem of the 
brain. When we see the same neuronal pattern fire in correlation with a given 
conscious experience, we move from the physical stance to the design stance, 
and approach the intentional, which is fully realized in the person
49
. 
What this passage makes clear is that both sides of the argument are not just concerned 
with what language to use for mental phenomena, but what a person is. For Dennett 
the self is unknowable because introspection is not infallible and the intentional stance 
is his answer in the quest to explain human nature. After the failed attempts of 
Descartes and the later phenomenologists to take first person introspection as the 
foundation of knowledge, real knowledge can only be assessed on the basis of rational 
external observation. We are our observable facts and our predicted actions. For Hacker 
and Bennett, we are something beyond the observable, not in a Cartesian dualist sense, 
not even in a Cartesian materialist sense but in a way that does not admit sharing that 
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sense with any one part of our constituent self. The attempt to describe this is the task 
of psychology, not neuroscience. 
Theological Implications of the Debate 
At this point there I must justify my choice of path for what is ultimately a 
theological work. What has been discussed so far has involved several disciplines, but 
not necessarily theology. Instead the debate surrounding neuroscience has so far been 
dealt with primarily by theology’s cousin, philosophy of religion. Would it not be more 
appropriate to say that the dialogue between neuroscience and the Christian religion 
should happen with the context of the Philosophy of Religion? Let us consider this.  
The famous definition of philosophy from Wilfred Sellars is  
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things 
in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest 
possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I 
include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but 
numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience 
and death. To achieve success in Philosophy would be, to use a 
contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect to 
all these things, not in that unreflective way in which the centipede of the 
story knew its way around before it faced the question, 'how do I walk?', 
but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are 
barred." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)  
 
If we expand the list of topics covered by philosophy to cabbages and kings and God 
then we can identify the particular section of things that philosophy of religion 
addresses. I will limit my definition to the way it is conceived in the West where the 
42 
 
primary questions asked are “What is God?” and “Can we reasonably say that God 
exists?”   
Theology as a discipline is an introspective and reactionary tool of the church 
which enables it to engage the world and itself from an a posteriori position.
50
 I do not 
mean reactionary in a negative way but with the sense that it must be preceded by 
something. To use the Anselmian definition, before there is the faith which seeks 
understanding theology cannot exist since it would really be some other thing seeking, 
some other –ology. Given the initial experience of faith in the divine it seeks to relate 
the revelation of God to the world and the faith community. After this initial move the 
study of theology works as a feedback loop which is always admitting new data whereby 
lived experience (tradition) informs the actualizing present and each new present 
becomes a part of an ever growing tradition. The continual living out of the reality of 
God’s revelation in different times and for different peoples is what provides the data 
that theology then reinterprets and feeds back into the Church. The philosophy of 
religion is a different, though related thing. Its primary aim is not to speak to the 
religious community but to discover through logic and argumentation the fundamental 
meaning and intelligibility of the Divine. All of this is done in a framework of logic and 
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non-contradiction. If the axiomatic in philosophy is reason, then the axiomatic in 
Theology is reflection. 
Analogically speaking
51
, if existence were a car, philosophy would seek to 
understand the mechanical makeup of the car, the nature and interrelation of all the 
parts and complex systems in the car. The philosophy of religion then would be inquiries 
into the maker of the car and the ultimate ends of that car. Christian Theology as a 
reflexive discipline looks in the glove box. Finds a manual and from that (plus insight 
gleaned from the philosophers) tries to determine how to best drive the car and what to 
do with it when it breaks down. This is it is now necessary for theologians to take up the 
task of examining neuroscience that was before only the concern of colleagues in 
philosophy or science departments. The manual contains diagrams and language which 
are not always familiar to the layman, yet need to be understood for the continued 
meaningful operation of the car. What was a broad scientific enquiry performed by 
scientists and conceptually influenced by philosophers is now affecting popular culture 
in the proliferation of neuroscientific language and ideas becoming a part of public 
discourse. It now affects ethics, rights issues, identity issues and the way people 
conceive of themselves.  
In the same way that Hacker and Bennett see a conceptual problem leading to 
confusion in neuroscience with regards to the location of consciousness, so to in 
theology the conceptual problem of where the soul is makes talking about what the soul 
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is difficult. If we say we have a soul, and yet there is no Cartesian theatre then what are 
we speaking of? Insofar as a word is a symbol that represents the object or action it 
describes so the word soul represents something. What is needed is greater clarity 
regarding just what it represents because the failure to be clear can lead to confusion. 
 When trying to picture a soul either in words or in images, the greatest 
sophistication most people can muster is a glowing ball of white light that emerges from 
a corpse after a person dies or as an ethereal doppelgänger of an individual. This type of 
image is especially common in out of body experiences which have been documented in 
the majority of world cultures
52
. Though the imagery is almost universal it has an 
animistic simplicity that is not well suited to theological reflection and does not provide 
any assistance in talking about the purported properties of the soul (immortality, 
immutability, incorporeality) Dennett’s term for this tendency is “folk psychology” which 
is a relic of religion as a proto-scientific attempt to explain the world. Philosophy for 
Dennett remains in this intellectual ghetto when it refuses to implement the new 
vocabulary of science.  Just because folk imagery of the soul is based upon debunked 
dualism does not mean that the soul itself is an incoherent concept. It means that the 
language used to describe a soul must admit new ideas and grammars in its explication. 
Let us quickly look at a few popular answers to what the soul is 
• Your soul is what makes you you. 
o This is a tautology which tells us nothing about what the soul is 
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• It’s the part of you that goes to heaven when you die 
o Here is an example of one of the activities ascribed to the soul, but it 
does not say what the part really is. 
• It’s a spark of the Divine in you 
o This is question begging in assuming that there is a divine other, and also 
that somehow that the divine is divisible. It also does not address the 
issue of personality, since a spark would be homogeneous in substance to 
its origins and would seem to deny basic individuation. (potentially 
satisfying soul claims for non-monotheistic religions) 
• It is an animating life-force 
o This may be closer to the truth but remains vague to the point of being 
unhelpful. 
 
While these descriptions are non-technical they reflect a mixture of scholarly opinions 
as well. The soul is referred to as the subject of human consciousness and does not die 
with the body by the Catechism of the Catholic Church) and while not false, 
demonstrates the intermingling of the terms mind and soul in Christian interpretations 




 dualism in his writings 
while Paul Tillich denies the immortality of the soul. Others such as Bultman and 
Bonhoeffer affirm a composite understanding, for Bonhoeffer “A human being does not 
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have a body or have a soul; instead a human is body and soul.”
55
   Is  a soul what makes 
you you? Is it possible for a person to be alive without a soul? Does a soul permeate a 
body so thoroughly that people who receive organ transplants receive a piece of 
another person’s soul? It can be said of animals too that they are alive or dead, and 
plants for that matter. Must the soul of a human be further qualified or will I see my 
dead cat in heaven? These questions, while sometimes couched in a technical language 
and at other times decidedly vernacular are of huge importance to the conception of 
the self and they are also exactly the sort of questions asked by laypeople in the church 
and in the wider world.  
The debate we have encountered between two factions of neuroscientists is 
riddled with problems of language as well as ontology. Saying what consciousness does 
and then making the leap to what consciousness is is precisely the same mistake made 
by theologians and laypeople who consider what the soul does or how it works and then 
says that is what the soul is. The merelogical fallacy can appear in soul talk especially in 
regards to eschatology. Common descriptions of salvation, especially amongst 
evangelicals are wholly focused on the soul. It is the soul that will go to hell, it is the soul 
that is blessed, and it is the soul that will go to heaven. Yet the soul is only ever 
identified as a part of the whole person as in Jesus’ command to “Love the lord you God 
with all your heart and all your soul and all your mind and all your strength” (Mark 
12:20) This is itself a retelling of the Jewish commandment of Deuteronomy 6:5 and as 
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we will see the Jewish model of the self found in the OT as well as the writings of Paul 
are necessary correctives against dualism.  
Consciousness supervenes on the brain and supervenience means that the mind 
cannot vary independently of the body
56
. While there may be a quest for the neuronal 
correlates of consciousness (NCC’s) there mere existence of such neurons will never 
explain the experience of consciousness
57
. By analogy is also becomes apparent that the 
modern understanding of the soul is as a something that supervenes on a living body
58
. 
While there may be a correlation to be discovered between consciousness and the soul 
that possibility is too large for this thesis to consider. We could take the position on the 
soul similar to Dennett and Searle’s position on the mind; that it is actually the sum of its 
properties because the idea of an independent ontology is nonsensical. Or we could 
argue along with Hacker and Searle that the mind is a thing which cannot at all be 
examined from a biological viewpoint, but the criticisms of this point of view are 
damning.  
In taking either option uncritically we separate ourselves from historic 
Christianity. The tension of where/what the mind is and consequently where/what the 
soul does not necessarily need to be resolved today and is in fact present within 
scripture itself. The Multiple Draft Model is effective for reading this tension fruitfully 
because in addition to providing an explanation of empirical it can help us coherently 
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talk about sanctification. The refusal to locate or separate the soul of a person through 
polysemous language and an aspectual treatment of the self is a crucial part of Paul’s 
anthropology.  In the following chapter I will propose the possibility of incorporating a 
Dennettian understanding of the mind that is not monistic but instead composite and 
not a separate thing but aspectual. I will do so still informed by the consciousness 
debates of neuroscience while engaging the writings of Christian thinkers both ancient 
and modern. What I intend to show is how the scriptures can be fruitfully read through 
a Dennettian lens and look towards a future grammar of the soul as encapsulated 
ontology which is non-monistic wherein the soul itself serves at the brackets that all that 
a person is and can be. 
 
Chapter 3 – Christian Accounts of the Mind 
 
As we have seen, the materialist account of the mind found in Daniel Dennett’s 
Multiple Draft Model has explanatory powers beyond those of traditional dualist 
accounts. The lack of any sort of central processing centre in the brain appears to give 
lie to the idea that there is a tethering point between the mind-as-separate-entity and 
the brain. Furthermore this absence makes it extremely difficult to accept any form of 
Cartesian materialism which would hold that the brain has a central theatre before 
which all sensory data is paraded. On top of this, Dennett’s intentional stance shows 
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how, over and against the claims of Hacker and Bennett
59
, the brain can be ascribed 
properties such that it can decide, prioritize and learn because from an external point of 
view the actions of neural systems exhibit a type of predictability similar to that of 
rational agents. To this point my examination has been looking at the way in which 
Dennett’s MDM overcomes the challenge of another contemporary theory of mind 
found in philosophy and I have done this to demonstrate the validity of using Dennett as 
a dialog partner. There has been a third way proposed by several Christian philosophers 
of mind and it deserves brief consideration before continuing.  
 The consciousness debate, while present in continental philosophy and to a 
lesser extent within traditional theological avenues is truly at home in the analytic 
school of philosophy. As such Christian interpretations therein are rarely framed as an 
explicitly Christian account; their proponents self-describe as dualists or theists (though 
in fact they are usually also Christians). As outlined by an insider there exist three 
modalities for understanding consciousness  
Some of us are physicalists, holding that all things that exist are physical entities, composed 
out of, and thus immediately explainable in terms of, the laws, particles and energies of 
microphysics. Others are dualists because they believe that at least humans, and perhaps 
other organisms as well, consist both of these physical components and of a soul, self, or 
spirit that is essentially non-physical. Emergence, I shall argue, represents a third option in 
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This is also the one of the clearest examples of the way the terms soul and mind 
interchangeable and should put to rest any concerns that neuroscientific research on 
the mind has no impact on our concept of the soul. 
 Emergence is not just a term found in the consciousness debate, it can be found 
throughout the natural sciences. Any object is said to have an emergent property when 
the whole has properties which are not reducible to the properties of its parts. For those 
who hold an emergent theory of mind such as Christian philosophers Phillip Clayton and 
William Hasker matter is explainable by the laws, particles and energies of microphysics 
but when that matter is arranged in a sufficiently complex way then new properties 
emerge, such as the human mind. I believe that Clayton’s methodology plays to the 
strengths of his opponents. As an illustration consider how this metaphor from a current 
cultural context demonstrates the futility of playing to the strengths of an opponent.  
In the 2006 film X-Men: Last Stand  fellow Haligonian Ellen Page plays the role of 
a mutant named Shadowcat with the ability to ethereally pass through solid matter 
while still maintaining a visible form that can speak/see/move (imagine the post-
resurrection Jesus of the Docetists to appreciate the mechanics of this). Her character is 
tasked with distracting a villain named Juggernaut whose fictional superpowers give him 
unlimited inertia; once he starts running he literally cannot be stopped. The ethereal 
Shadowcat lures Juggernaut into chasing her and she uses her power to run through 
wall after wall, hoping these material barriers will slow the progress of a thoroughly 
material enemy. Yet Juggernaut smashes through all the barriers effortlessly because 
51 
 
that is who he is, he is made to smash through everything. Without changing tactics we 
assume the heroine would eventually run out of walls and be caught. It is only when 
another mutant (continuing the name-as-plot-function trope) named Leech absorbs the 
power of Juggernaut that he is defeated.   
The emergentist positions problem will remain a problem so long as it leaves the 
power of the material to the materialist. As Connor Cunningham said above there is a 
distinction between methodological and ontological materialism and for emergence 
theorists, the ontological definition of the material world seems to stand. Since as we 
saw a theory is always in danger of falsification through the discovery of new data, 
emergence theory of mind is never more than one new discovery away from 
irrelevance. While not to deny the existence of emergent properties within the natural 
sciences declaring the mind to be an emergent property tout court at a time of such 
rapidly expanding knowledge about the human brain seems unwise. Returning to the 
illustration we see the emergent theory of mind functions as the latest barrier thrown 
up by fleeing dualists in attempt to slow the advance of the materialist juggernaut. The 
historical re-enactment of the role of Shadowcat by those seeking to preserve the 
separate existence of mind limits their definition of victory to simply outrunning the foe; 
an intellectual rear-guard of various dualist models of the self which each in turn fall to 
materialist critiques. But whether or not emergence fails along with older theories what 
hope, if any, is there of finding a Leech to usurp the power of the material?  
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The material world in the emergentist framework is still one wholly governed by 
a naturalist ontology which it attempts to escape by passing through the physical 
boundary and emerging as an irreducible new thing; a mind which is a not explicable by 
any laws which govern lower states and capable of downward causation. As such this is 
a mind still susceptible to eliminative materialism’s universal acid which leaves nihilism 
in its wake; the emergentists claim rests on the absence of reductive models of the 
mind. By pinning its hopes to the ultimate ineffability of the brain, it leaves itself open to 
refutation by verification.  Though it emerges from completely naturalistic causes the 
emergent mind has the hallmarks of a Cartesian soul; it has no extension in space, it is 
self-aware and it has a causal relation with the body.  The error is similar to that of the 
intelligent design movement which as Cunningham says “declares that science, in the 
face of unanswered questions, must look to religious explanations”
61
. The more 
appropriate response should be to ask for more and better science regarding the mind 
and from theologians, more and better arguments for the re-enchantment of the 
material.     
In surveying the literature available it is surprising how in the mind debate 
among theists the belief in dualistic or emergent theories of mind is engaged from a 





 century Theologians who were contemporaries of Gilbert Ryle acknowledged 
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his criticisms of dualism and were willing to frame the debate over Christian 
anthropology in terms that aligned with contemporary philosophy which, they 
understood even in the fifties to be congruent with a Hebrew concept of the human. 
The influence of German Idealism via Historical criticism on Pauline exegesis may have 
overemphasized the impact of Hellenism on his thought but even in the middle of the 
century this was being corrected. There is greater consensus in this regard amongst OT 
scholars as noted by J. Middleton in The Liberating Image
63
. Amongst NT scholars the 
proponents of the New Perspective continue to strengthen this view of the Jewish 
nature of Paul’s writings. I will now turn to the way in which this Jewish conception 
works in concert with the MDM experience. 
 The simplest theological argument against any sort of dualist or emergentist 
account of the mind is that the Bible does not talk in these terms; at least it does not 
talk about the mind as a separate category. Rather the Hebrew view of the person found 
in the OT is an aspectual and not a partitive description and Paul faithfully follows this 
pattern writing throughout his letters.
6465
 In other words when a person says “I have a 
soul” or “I have a mind” it is the same as saying “I have a nationality.” or “I have a 
fever.” These are aspectual statements in comparison to partitively saying “I have a 
hand.” or “I have a nervous system.”  
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   Similarly, imago Dei theology has been used in its substantialist form to argue for 
a form of dualism wherein the mind or soul is the locus of immaterial part of the self. As 
J. Richard Middleton notes “The vast majority of interpreters’ right up to recent times 
have understood the meaning of the image in terms of a metaphysical analogy or 
similarity between the human soul and the being of God”
66
 But Middleton stresses this 
is not correct and does not reflect the bulk of scholarship on the Old Testament. He  
goes on to say “Most patristic, medieval, and modern interpreters typically asked not an 
exegetical, but a speculative question: In what way are humans like God and unlike 
animals?”
67
 Asking this speculative question instead of an exegetical one is clearly 
evident in Cartesian thought since for Descartes, animals were just sophisticated 
automata
68
. While strong forms of this view, normally attributed to Descartes but in fact 
promulgated by his followers including Malebranche
69
, have contributed to a caricature 
of his thought on animals Descartes actually was willing to concede a type of soul to 
animals. But this soul was corporeal and not spiritual “…the souls of animals are nothing 
but their blood…” 
70
 and did not impute to animals the properties of rationality or self-
awareness that are hallmarks of dualistic interpretations of the human soul.  
   The closest Greek word to our modern understanding of a material body is 
soma and the word was used frequently in Antiquity to describe the physical part of a 
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person; in Homer the word is used specifically to refer to corpses.
71
 So if we were 
looking for a Paul who speaks of the person partitively in a way that supports dualism 
then his use of soma would prove instructive. While Paul does use the word it never 
refers to the dead, in fact in Rmn 12:1 Paul appeals to the church to ' to present your 
bodies (somata) as a living sacrifice’ which seems to foreclose on the idea of the body as 
inert material, our bodies must be alive in order to qualify as sacrifices. The close 
following of the exhortation of Rmn 13:1 ‘Let every person (psyche) be subject to the 
governing authorities’ demonstrates the ease with which Paul switches from body 
language to soul language and the consensus among translators that these words have 
the same connotation in Scripture. Reading these as partitive terms for persons leads to 
confusion since it would imply Paul has different advice for different parts of the person. 
It is nonsensical to think that Paul would want our bodies to do one thing; our souls do 
another unless of course Paul actually was a dualist. This would only become less 
intelligible when we encounter more parts of the self. 
Turning to 1 Thessalonians the benediction of 5:23 says “Now may the God of 
peace himself sanctify you completely, and may your whole mind (pneuma) and soul 
(psyche) and body (soma) be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” This 
might seem to suggest that Paul might have had some sort of tripartite view, but if so 
should we reread scripture to see just what our spirit should be doing and compare this 
to the actions of our soul, our body, and perhaps even our fallen body (sarx)? Whiteley 
cuts through this and notes that although the language at first glance is partitive the 
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thought is unitary. “If he had been a metaphysical or anthropological dualist, he would 
have prayed that when the sinful body perished the Spirit, and perhaps even the soul, 
would soar aloft to its natural abode.”
72
 Considered as aspectual language this preserves 
the unity of the person while stressing the extent to which every aspect must be turned 
towards sanctification. Although Paul does address his audience using all of these terms 
at different times, he does not condone the sanctification of one aspect at the expense 
of another. There is no one aspect of the person that carries more weight than any 
other just as for Dennett there is no one “canonical draft” which tells the ultimate story 
of conscious experience. To help illustrate this diagram 1, which is modelled on the 
traditional shield of the Trinity is a clear picture of how to think about Paul’s self and the 
relation of mind to that self.
73
 
The faithful re-presentation of a Jewish understanding of the unitary nature of 
man is something that is particularly important to Paul. Outside the Pauline corpus there 
are examples of soma used in more typically Greek ways: 
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Jude 1:9 speaks of the Archangel Michael and the dead body (soma) of Moses and in 
Hebrew 13 the word is used for the bodies of animals (somata) destined to be used in 
burnt offerings. Given the paucity of these examples though, and considered against the 
importance of the Pauline letters and the Jewish origins of Christianity, these examples 
are more likely to demonstrate the Hellenistic influence on thought in the Levant during 
the time of the writing of the New Testament than they are proof of a dualistic self. 
Furthermore at no point in the Old or New Testament is there any account of the self 
that favours the sanctification of one part of the self at the expense of others. So 
reading of Paul as holding a unitary view of man is faithful to the scholarly tradition, now 
within the unitary nature of the self (over and against a unitary nature of the mind) let 




Multiple Drafts: A model for tension and relation 
 
 The great benefit of accepting the Multiple Draft Model of consciousness is that 
is allows for a coherent description of tension and relation in the even after we have 
admitted that creation is ontologically monistic. In dualist or emergent frameworks, 
there is a grammar of division which force the Christian to interpret passages which 
speak of conflict and relationship as a bifurcation of the self and the sanctification of the 
self becomes an act of amputation rather than purification. Looking at the classic text of 
internal conflict we read:  
For I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do 
the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is 
good. So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me.  For I know 
that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do 
what is right, but not the ability to carry it out.  For I do not do the good I want, 
but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing.  Now if I do what I do not want, 
it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. So I find it to be a law that 
when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God, in 
my inner being,  but I see in my members another law waging war against the law 
of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members. 
(Romans 7:15-23) 
 
If we assumed that Paul was in fact a dualist we would expect that in examining the war 
between the law of his mind and the law of his members the natural response would be 
to mortify or amputate his members. The gnostic flavour of that suggestion is as obvious 
as it is heretical but nevertheless an easily drawn conclusion if we are not careful. 
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 First the passage begins with an admission that even Paul’s own self-awareness 
is not sufficient to explain what he does. One criticism levelled against the MDM is that 
it subverts the common sense approach to the mind; that is whatever I might think I am 
experiencing as consciousness is not in fact the case. This would imply that I should be 
able to intuitively arrive at an exhaustive understanding of my own actions but that is 
not so as demonstrated by the phi experiment discussed above and is attested by Paul 
himself. Paul is admitting that exhaustive knowledge of his inner workings is not 
available to him, and the theme of the inability to fully comprehend the self persists 
through to the theology of Radical Orthodoxy via Blondel
74
 . In MDM the brains 
subsystems are in essence spin-doctoring a disjointed mass of sensory information into 
an intelligible stream of consciousness and so when pressed it stands to reason that our 
intuitive understanding of our actions slips between our fingers like so much clutching at 
sand. 
 Though we may not understand our own actions exhaustively, it is certain from 
human experience, and clear from Paul’s writing that there is some sort of conflict. 
Returning to the diagram and stretching the analogy one of the characteristics of the 
relationships within the Trinity is that they are in perfect harmony with one another. 
The human condition does not demonstrate such perfect harmony, nor is there an 
infinite depth of self-knowledge.  As imperfect beings any relationship within us must 
therefore also be imperfect. It is there, in the self-reflective disunity of the self that the 
MDM arises. Multiple sensory systems within the brain, in concert with more complex 
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brain sections tasked with synthesizing the sensory data, are constantly vying to assert 
the primacy of their information. The particular impulses which are preventing Paul 
from doing that which he “wants” to do are not external forces which vex his own 
internal efforts, nor are they a part of his mind which needs to be cut out in some sort of 
literal application of the sermon on the Mount. The attempt of the right ordering of the 
mind an exercise in harmonizing, rather than a violent excision
75
 
 The MDM also is a response to the need for a material explanation of 
consciousness. Christian theologians such as Nancey Pearcy have demonstrated that 
Christian Materialism is intelligible and Biblical references to creation can support this 
while not falling into an ontological naturalism such as that found in Dennett’s writing. If 
we are to spread the Gospel to all Creation (Mk 16:15) and if stones can cry out (Hab 
2:11) then it would be foolish to think that the Bible teaches that Creation is not in some 
way both material and special. The problem faced by Dennett, and especially engaged 
by Owen Flanagan is how to find meaning in a world composed only of matter, to say 
nothing of how to deal with Wallace’s paradox. The answer is not to posit an immaterial 
world in which God exists and therefore serves as a conduit for real meaning.  
The true answer is almost so simple it gets overlooked. Matter matters. Insofar 
that all of existence is God’s creation then it is all a part of the salvific plan for the 
universe and if we are to properly interact with we must do so understanding our own 
complete materiality, holding this idea forever next to the knowledge that it was into 
such matter that God emptied Godself in the form of Jesus. It is also through the use of 
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material agents (us) that God will bring about the Kingdom. In the language of Radical 
Orthodoxy this is the suspension of the material; Creation is held over the void and 
threatened with dissolution and yet is upheld by virtue its participation in the Divine 
order.  
Paul can and should be read as understanding this internal dissonance, though in 
a pre-theoretic way. While relying on intuitive understandings of the mind there is a 
tendency to fall into dualist language, owing to the diverse terms that Paul uses to 
describe his internal states. The work of Dennett to describe how the brain works in the 
absence of an immaterial mind allows us to read Paul’s struggles in a way that is 
completely congruent with a monist view of human anthropology and indeed all of 
Creation. Furthermore the robustness of Dennett’s Multiple Draft model in the face of 
criticism from the mind-as-separate-category camp of Hacker and Bennett 
demonstrates the dangers of ignoring this debate in favour of the current theological 
status quo; if Christian philosophers of mind hitch their arguments to ideas are rebutted 
outside the theological realm then eventually their ideas will face the same critiques. 
 Dennett and Paul are both monists, that is, their writings both 
demonstrate a belief that a human being is made up of one substance and they 
advocate against any competing claims of a dualist or even tripartite self. For Dennett 
the mind is not a separate category of thing because it is composed of the biological 
systems that form the brain. For Paul neither the mind nor the soul is a separate 
category because they are the properties of the systems, both natural and supernatural 
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that forms a human being. Dennett’s ascription of mental attributes to the brain and 
even parts of the brain is justified by his intentional stance, which allows us to 
determine from a 3rd person examination how an object or system ought to behave. 
Paul’s anthropology is obviously broader in what it accepts as valid data, that is not only 
verifiable fact but he also does not talk about the self as a dualist or tripartite nature. 
The ease with which he uses terms interchangeably and his desire to see all “parts” of 
the self is better read as a description of different “aspects’ of the person. The 
composite nature of these aspects and their disharmony explains the possibility of a 
“war in the members” better than competing dualist models and also provides a better 
model of sanctification through the harmonizing of our internal aspects. 
At the outset of this thesis it was noted that Christians are commanded to resist 
the spirit of the world, but that we must be aware of just what form the world-spirit is 
taking. It is also evident from my writing that I find analogy and metaphor to be one of 
the most important tools used in dialog with the world and so I would suggest one 
more. Resisting the world is never accomplished by running away from the world; since 
like Jonah wherever we run the world is still there.  It is done by being almost exactly 
like the world and yet inverted by embodying resistance like a magnet or ionized 
particles. It is that inversion of Dennett’s MDM that I have performed here not just as an 
attempt to paternalistically redeem his ideas but because they are actually productive.  
Failure to engage him as a thinker would be an act of running away while success in the 
engagement broadens the extent of Christian engagement with the world. Going 
forward there is a rich vein of tradition that embraces the multivalent aspectual nature 
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of the individual and especially the aspect of the person which we label the soul which 
deserves new consideration. The understanding of the self through Dennettian eyes will 
allow for a better reading not just of Paul’s anthropology but all other parts of the 
tradition which have been subsumed into the feedback loop of theology. Now that this 
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